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BOOK REVIEW

Intramural Dialogue and The Malaise
of Religious Freedom
Edited by Rex J. Ahdar.
RELIGION.
LAW
AND
Ashgate/Dartmouth: Aldershot, Burlington USA, Singapore, Sydney.
2000. xiii, 229 pp.
Reviewed by Steven D. Smith*
Discussions of religious freedom in the United States tend to be a
pretty parochial affair. Lawyers, judges, and scholars in this country
usually limit ourselves to debating the meaning and significance of
our Constitution, our history, and our precedents. We know, of
course, that issues of religious freedom arise elsewhere-almost
everywhere, in fact-and we may even address these issues when we
are discussing matters of international law or foreign policy. But we
seem to suppose that we ourselves have little to learn from our
counterparts in other countries. Or perhaps, acting on an implicit
assumption of "American exceptionalism," we imagine that our own
constitutional provisions are so distinctive that discourse elsewhere
would simply not be relevant to understanding our law. In any case,
although scholars in other countries are often well-versed in U.S. law
on religious freedom, it is rare for scholars or jurists in the United
States to turn to a Canadian case or an interpretation of the
European Convention on Human Rights for help in considering an
issue of religious freedom that arises in the United States.'
This insular focus would be understandable, perhaps, if the U.S.
discourse of religious freedom were in superb condition. But everyone
seems to agree that it is not. The title to Marie Failinger's

Robert and Marion Short Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School.

*

1.

There are exceptions.

See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 217-30 (2000); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 287-

328 (1998); W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism,
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421,
447-60.
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contribution to the present volume-"Wondering after Babel" 2 -is
indicative. Michael McConnell's essay expresses a virtual consensus:
the law of religious freedom in this country is "chaotic, controversial
and unpredictable"-"hopelessly inconsistent. '3 So the time seems
opportune to expand the horizons. We might benefit from some
wisdom from abroad.
This book, edited by Rex Ahdar, a professor at the University of
Otago in New Zealand, attempts to initiate a more inclusive dialogue
by collecting original essays on law and religion written by leading
scholars not only from the United States but also from England,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. 4 Such a project
encounters predictable problems: the essays vary in quality, and a
"ships passing in the night" character is sometimes apparent. Still,
all in all, the book is a valuable contribution to the effort to bring a
broader range of insights and experience to bear on the problems of
religious freedom.
But the book's main value, a skeptic might object, lies mostly in
dashing false hopes that a more cosmopolitan exchange will yield
valuable insights. I will explain why I think this skeptical conclusion
would be mistaken. Still, it is true that on one level the essays seem
calculated to provide occasions for transnational commiseration more
than to open up sources of-fresh wisdom. If there is a legal system
that has found a viable and attractive approach to the problems of
religious freedom, that system is not revealed in these essays. On the
contrary, despite some significant differences in different nations'
approaches to religion, 5 the analyses and front-line reports from other
countries often seem drearily familiar. Religious freedom, one might
conclude, seems to present basically the same intractable political
and conceptual problems everywhere.
Well, not quite everywhere-or at least these essays would not
support that global diagnosis. In fact, although the range of legal
experience reflected in this volume is admittedly much broader than
that invoked in the typical U.S. discussion, the conversation is still in

2.
Marie A. Failinger, Wondering after Babel: Power, Freedom and Ideology in
US Supreme Court Interpretationsof the Religion Clauses, in LAW AND RELIGION 81
(Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000).
3.
Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation:
Tensions in American FirstAmendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 64 (Rex J.
Ahdar ed., 2000).
4.
A similar-and similarly titled-but heftier volume collecting essays by
scholars (including Ahdar, as well as the author of this review) from an even larger
number of countries recently appeared under the sponsorship of University College,
London. See LAw AND RELIGION (Andrew Lewis & Richard O'Dair eds., 2001).
5.
For example, the U.K. and the Continental legal systems typically lack the
U.S. obsession with "nonestablishment" as a commitment in itself. They may even
retain, at least nominally, an established church. Scholars and jurists in some
countries still debate the viability of laws punishing "blasphemy"-not exactly a hot
topic in the United States.
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a sense intramural. All of the contributors come from countries that
are firmly entrenched in what Samuel Huntington's recent and much
discussed study classifies as "Western" civilization. Huntington, a
political scientist at Harvard, argues that the most appropriate unit
for understanding politics and culture is not the nation-state but
rather the "civilization": commonalities among nations within a given
civilization are more important than variations, whereas differences
among civilizations provide the main lines of division that will shape
politics. 6

Applying Huntington's categories, we notice that the

essayists in this book are either from England, or from countries
whose legal and political systems descend from England, or from just
There are no contributors from Muslim
across the Channel.
countries, or from India, or China, or even from Russia or another
legal system associated with the Orthodox branch of Christianity.
And as Huntington's analysis would predict, despite their differences
the essayists largely share a broad but discernible orientation toward
the issues of religious freedom.
This observation is not intended as a criticism of the book. Intracivilizational dialogue is a worthy project; it is more than we have
typically managed in the past, and is not to be spurned just because it
Indeed, the
is not also inter-civilizational in character.
in
the United
scholars
that
legal
and
suspicion
incomprehension
States often exhibit toward, say, Christian fundamentalists who live
almost in their own backyards might prompt us to wonder whether
obstacles of cultural incommensurability would preclude a genuine
conversation between Western scholars and people who speak from,
say, a thoroughly Islamic worldview-though the effort certainly
seems worth making. My point, in any case, is that the very
sameness, so to speak, of the problems encountered in other Western
countries may itself be revealing: it suggests the possibility that,
contrary to a common supposition, our frustrations might be less the
result of peculiarities in U.S. law-of the celebrated "conflict between
the clauses," for example-and more the product of deeper and
longer-term assumptions and tendencies of Western civilization
generally.

See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND
6.
THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). Huntington contends that the world today

divides into seven or perhaps eight major civilizations, which he calls "Sinic,"
"Japanese," "Hindu," "Islamic," "African," "Orthodox," "Western," and "Latin
American"-which might be classified either as a separate civilization or a
"subcivilization within Western civilization." Id. at 45-47.
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THE INTRACTABILITY OF FREE EXERCISE

Consider, for example, the by now almost ancient question of
whether religious objectors should be exempted from generally
applicable laws that burden the exercise of their religion. Should
Should Native
Quakers be excused from the military draft?
Americans who use peyote in worship be exempted in that context
from a state's drug laws? It is well-known that after a period in
which the U.S. Supreme Court purported to mandate exemptions for
the exercise of religion subject to a "compelling interest" balancing
test, the Court changed direction just over a decade ago and ruled
that exemptions are not constitutionally required. The change was
widely criticized, but congressional efforts to restore greater
7
protection for religious exercise have been rebuffed by the Court.
Hardly anyone seems happy with the current state of the law in the
8
United States.
Critics who favor more ample protection often blame the current
state of affairs in part on a supposed "conflict between the clauses":
the First Amendment's nonestablishment clause, which has often
been construed to mean that government cannot "aid" or "advance"
religion, is thought to make it more difficult for courts to interpret
free exercise as mandating exemptions that in an important sense aid
religion. Those who adopt this diagnosis sometimes argue that one
ought to treat the First Amendment as containing only a "religion
clause"-in the singular--devoted to the unitary purpose of
protecting religious freedom; 9 in this way, it is thought, the "no aid"
impediment to full protection for free exercise might be eliminated.
In addition, proponents of more fulsome free exercise protection may
attribute current problems in part to the U.S. Constitution's less than
lucid wording; a more carefully drafted legal provision might fend off
the fettered interpretation that the modern Court has devised.
Hence, these proponents may support proposals for more precise and
encompassing legal language, to be adopted by statute-such as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act invalidated by the Supreme Court
in Boerne v. Flores-orperhaps even by constitutional amendment.

7.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
8.
The book contains succinct overviews of these developments in the essays
by Failinger and McConnell. See Failinger, supra note 2, at 86-90; McConnell, supra
note 3, at 65-69. My own interpretation of these developments is somewhat different
but need not be argued here. See STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A
CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 91-106 (2001).
9.
See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 n.8, 540 (1991).
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Professor McConnell has contributed as significantly to these
discussions of free exercise as anyone in the U.S. legal academy,
consistently advocating more encompassing free exercise protection.
His essay in this volume continues in this vein. The essay opens by
describing the clash between the establishment and free exercise
clauses and the associated tension in the purposes ascribed to the
First Amendment in matters of religion. Some think the provision is
mainly intended to ensure "separation" between government and
religion, McConnell reports; others see the goal as "neutrality," while
still others say that the overall objective is simply "religious
liberty."10 McConnell then turns to the problem of free exercise
exemptions, noting that even when legislatures choose to
accommodate the exercise of religion, "[t]he constitutionality of these
accommodation statutes is frequently challenged under the
Establishment Clause, on the theory that they 'favour' religion over
non-religion."1 1 After a survey of some establishment clause issues,
McConnell concludes by listing possible "solutions," which he frames
in terms of the possible responses to the previously described conflict
between the clauses. We could maintain strong commitments to both
clauses with their associated competing values (thus reinforcing the
existing incoherence)
or, contrariwise,
retreat
from both
commitments (thus subjecting religious minorities to the vicissitudes
of democratic politics) or we could adhere to a strong
nonestablishment commitment while diluting free exercise protection,
thereby turning the Constitution into a "force for secularization."
Conversely, the United States could relax the nonestablishment
concern while retaining the dedication to free exercise. Consistent
with his long-articulated views, McConnell endorses this last
12
alternative.
McConnell's essay is concise, informative, elegantly structured,
and carefully reasoned. But is his analysis sound? An essay by
Malcolm Evans, though not directly responsive to McConnell's
discussion, gives cause to doubt. Evans, a professor at the University
of Bristol and a leading authority on international human rights law
in the area of religion, mainly discusses the history of rulings by the
UN Human Rights Committee on Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and of the International Covenant on
13
Civil and Political Rights.

10.
McConnell, supra note 3, at 64.
11
Id. at 69. Essays in this book by U.S. scholars have been edited to conform
to British spelling.
12.
Id. at 74-76.
13.
See generally Malcolm D. Evans, The United Nations and Freedom of
Religion: The Work of the Human Rights Committee, in LAW AND RELIGION 35 (Rex J.
Ahdar ed., 2000).
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These provisions are, in a sense, a more expansive and
elaborated international law counterpart to the First Amendment's
free exercise clause, and they might seem nicely designed to avoid the
difficulties that scholars like McConnell perceive in U.S. free exercise
jurisprudence. In the first place, the international provisions are not
encumbered by any corresponding "nonestablishment clause" with
which they stand in tension. So there is no worry here about a
"conflict between the clauses." In addition, the wording of the
international provisions seems more forthcoming on the issue of free
exercise exemptions. Article 18 of the International Covenant, for
instance, expressly declares that religious freedom encompasses the
right of a believer "to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching," and it specifies that the
"[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental freedoms of
others."'1 4
Schooled in the criticisms of U.S. free exercise
jurisprudence developed by scholars like McConnell, we might expect
that by self-consciously avoiding our particular pitfalls, the
international law approach would be less confused and would also
provide more generous legal protection for the free exercise of
religion.
Sanguine expectations such as these will not survive Evans'
essay.
Evans explains that in construing the international
provisions, the UN Human Rights Committee has had to deal with
three kinds of questions: "1 What forms of belief enjoy the 'freedom to
manifest'? 2 What is a 'manifestation'? 3 What is the scope of the
legitimate restrictions?"1 5 These questions should seem entirely
familiar to U.S. students of free exercise, though the typical wording
would be slightly different. We ask: What is "religion?" How much
of "religion"-belief only, or conduct as well-is protected by the First
Amendment?
And what state interests are sufficient to justify
restrictions on free exercise?
So the questions to be addressed are similar. What may be
surprising is that the answers seem similar-and similarly
disappointing as well-even though the provisions are discernibly
different in their wording, and even though there is no competing
nonestablishment
provision
to
inhibit
the
international
interpretations.
Thus, in Evans' review of the Human Rights Committee's
interpretations two motifs emerge. The first is uncertainty: though
the international provisions are lengthier than the U.S. clause and
seem calculated to achieve precision, in fact their meaning remains

14.
15.

Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added) (quoting Article 18).
Id. at 37.
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opaque. The provisions use terms like "religion," "belief," "thought,"
and "conscience," and Evans observes that the adoption and
subsequent interpretation of these provisions "put into stark relief
the uncomfortable fact that there was no general understanding of
'16
what any of these separate terms actually meant.
Summarizing the results of the Human Rights Committee's
efforts even to clarify what "religion" is, he comments that "[i]n terms
of practical guidance, this amounts to lean pickings from 50 years'
worth of experience. '17 A later essay by Evans' colleague Julian
Rivers projects this uncertainty into the English system, which by
statute has recently incorporated the international norms into the
law of the United Kingdom. Rivers carefully considers a variety of
specific and controversial areas-church autonomy, education,
marriage, employment, blasphemy-and concludes that the law is
"vague as a matter of substance, but it is also vague as to the
relevance of Convention rights at all in many areas of law." 18
The second motif that emerges in Evans' review is that despite
international law texts that seem calculated to be strongly protective
of religion, in reality the UN Human Rights Committee has
consistently interpreted that law to provide little or no actual
protection. Thus, the Committee has construed "religion" narrowly.
And it has accepted almost any governmental interest as a sufficient
reason for curtailing religious "manifestation." Parallels to U.S.
decisions-decisions rendered under provisions that are worded quite
differently-are readily apparent.
In a case from Canada, for
instance, the Committee rejected a complaint filed by a Sikh who had
been discharged for wearing a turban at work. The Committee ruled
that "requiring workers in federal employment [to] be protected from
injury and electric shock by the wearing of hard hats is to be regarded
as reasonable. .".."19 The ruling is strongly reminiscent of Goldman
v. Weinberger,20 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the free
exercise clause did not prevent the Air Force from forbidding a
psychologist who was also a rabbi from wearing a yarmulke while
working in the mental health clinic of a military base. The ruling is
also evocative of TWA v. Hardison,2 1 in which the Court through
aggressively insouciant construction diluted the language of a federal

16.
17.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 43.

18.
Julian Rivers, From Toleration to Pluralism: Religious Liberty and
Religious Establishment under the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act, in LAW AND
RELIGION 133, 154 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000).
19.

Evans, supra note 13, at 51 (quoting K. Singh Bhinder v. Canada, 208 Eur.

Ct. H.R. (1986),
20.
21.

6.2).

Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986).
See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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statute mandating accommodation of religion in the workplace into
an insipid de minimis "reasonableness" provision.
In another case, the Human Rights Committee considered a
complaint by individuals in the Netherlands who had converted to
Hinduism and wished to change their surnames in order to train as
Hindu priests. It is hard to imagine any powerful governmental
interest that would be jeopardized by allowing such a change.
Nonetheless, the Committee rejected the Hindus' complaint with the
peremptory observation that "the regulation of surnames and the
change thereof [is] eminently a matter of public order ... 22 Evans
remarks that no real assessment of the strength of the governmental
interest seems to have occurred: "It is almost as if the finding of a
legitimate ground for restricting the enjoyment of the freedom of
'23
[religious] manifestation is sufficient in itself.
Evans concludes his review by suggesting that "[p]erhaps the
most abiding impression of an examination of the work of the
[Human Rights Committee] . . . is that freedom of religion is . . .
viewed as more of a problem than as an ambition-something which,
although doubtless a good thing in principle, is to be viewed with
caution." 24 The Committee has taken a miserly attitude "despite...
2' 5
[legal] language which often implies the opposite.
In short, the results in the international context and in U.S.
jurisprudence seem remarkably similar, even though the formal legal
texts and commitments seem to be significantly different. What
might account for these strikingly equivalent outcomes?

A "WESTERN" APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
In considering this question, we might remark on one factor that
is so obvious that it would usually go unmentioned: both McConnell
and Evans are concerned with materials arising out of texts that,
though markedly different in their wording, are legal texts; and as a
result these scholars are both studying and practicing a form of legal
discourse. And from this common feature, others flow.
For example, these essayists along with other scholars and
lawyers in Western legal systems are engaged in a discourse that
aspires to be rational in character: after all, rationality-or "reason"
-has long been thought to be the very essence of Western law and

22.
Evans, supra note 13, at 51 (quoting AR Coviel and MAR Aurik v. The
Netherlands, 453 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1991), 6.1).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 52.
25.
Id.
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the source of its authority. 26 This rationalist discourse proceeds with
the confidence that matters of religion can be governed by rules or
principles that are articulable in words-words that can be
dispassionately examined in the quiet detachment of a professor's
office or a judge's chambers and that carry meanings that can be
extracted and then applied with logical consistency across a wide
range of seemingly disparate situations. In this exercise the vice to
is
be steadfastly avoided, from a rationalist perspective,
"inconsistency" or "incoherence": an "inconsistent" or "incoherent"
position is, after all, the antithesis of a "rational" one. McConnell is
especially insistent on this point:
It is one thing to be attentive to the specific facts of each case in
applying constitutional doctrine, but it is quite another to maintain
that two ostensible constitutional principles are in direct conflict, and
to refuse to choose between them. When A contradicts B, they cannot
both be correct. If A appears to contradict B, it is the interpreter's
responsibility to decide that A is correct and not B, that B is correct and
not A, or (possibly) to find a synthesis of A and B that combines the best
features of both. Simply to vacillate between them on the basis of "the
particular facts of each case" is an invitation to incoherence, and
27
ultimately to perceived illegitimacy.

A further feature that accompanies the legalist character of the
discussion is an assumption that the ultimate interpretive and
enforcing authority for the applicable texts will be courts. 28 These
two essays are hardly distinctive in this respect: Sophie van
Bijsterveld, a professor at the University of Tilburg in the
Netherlands, notes that under both European and more global
model is that of
religious freedom provisions, "the predominant
'2 9
individual rights backed by the courts.
Van Bijsterveld's observation alludes to an additional feature
characteristic of the typical Western approach to religious freedomits proclivity to frame the issues in terms of the rights of

26.
See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF
REASON (1998) (examining this claim in the context of U.S. Constitutional law).
McConnell, supra note 3, at 76-77.
27.
Evans' essay reflects a partial qualification to this statement: he reports
28.
mostly on the interpretations given international human rights law by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. But of course this law is also applied in courts-for
example, the essay by Rivers, supra note 18, discusses how it may be applied in
English courts in the wake of that country's decision to incorporate it into domestic
law-so the Committee's interpretations can be seen as providing guidance to courts.
Moreover, even if the Committee has no army of marshals waiting to enforce its
rulings, the Committee's own procedures seem in many respects to mirror judicial
proceedings.
29.
Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, Religion, International Law and Policy in the
Wider EuropeanArena: New Dimensions and Developments, in LAW AND RELIGION 163
(Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000).
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individuals. 30 To be sure, there are those who resist an exclusive
emphasis on the individualist aspect of religion. In the United
States, scholars such as Douglas Laycock and Frederick Mark
Gedicks have perceptively called attention to the institutional or
associative dimension of religion. 31 Many faiths have an essentially
communal character, they explain; to depict these faiths in terms of
voluntary individual choices-or even of individuals freely choosing to
associate together to promote their religious values and objectivesmay distort these faiths beyond anything that the believers
themselves would recognize as their own.
Nonetheless, the
individualist orientation of what van Bijsterveld describes as "the
predominant model" makes it difficult for Western legal systems to
assimilate these insights.
The individualism of the prevailing perspective is itself merely
one feature of a more encompassing framework that van Bijsterveld
describes as "the liberal paradigm." This paradigm, she explains,
divides the social world into "the 'public' and the 'private'." Religion
is assigned to the "private" realm, leaving the "public" sphere entirely
secular; and "[r]eligious liberty ... is a right of the individual citizen
to non-interference from the public authority. '3 2 Van Bijsterveld
comments that although this paradigm is common to most Western
legal systems, "[i]n its purest sense, this model echoes the American
Jeffersonian notion of the 'wall of separation' between Church and
33
state."
This
constellation
of
features-legalism,
rationalism,
individualism, assumed commitments to private religion and a
secular public sphere-is apparent throughout these essays. To be
sure, not all Western scholars or jurists will be equally committed to
each of these features. For example, although Professor McConnell
adheres to a "legalist" and "rationalist" approach, as noted, he has
also been among the most persistent and articulate critics of the
notion that religion must be excluded from the public sphere. 34 Still,
it is hard to deny that these features, in differing combinations and to
differing degrees, characterize most Western discussions of religious
freedom. This book is a case in point: nearly all of the essays in this

30.
Professor Huntington argues that emphases both on human rights and on
individualism are characteristics distinctive of Western civilization. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 6, at 71, 192-98.
31.
See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1373 (1981); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudence of

Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99.
32.
Van Bijsterveld, supra note 29, at 165-66.
33.
Id. at 166.
34.
See Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious
Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation,1999 UTAH L. REV. 639.
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collection at least acknowledge, and often endorse, these liberal and
legalist commitments.
So it seems plausible to view these commitments as reflecting a
distinctive "Western" approach to religious freedom. To fill out this
description of the "Western" approach, however, I think we need to
add at least two other features. First, because it emphasizes a
legalist, rationalist, and court-centered approach to the matter of
religious freedom, the Western approach also implicitly demands that
controversies will be resolved by a special class of people-by lawyers
and, more generally, by the more educated class of citizens. All of the
contributors to this volume-as well as its present reviewer-are, of
course, professors working in universities; and their audience consists
largely of other professors and perhaps-or so the essayists may hopelawyers and judges. There is an irony here, no doubt, because
Western liberalism also purports to be devoutly egalitarian: equality,
35
including religious equality, is a value prized above all others.
Nonetheless, the Western approach assigns decisions about the scope,
meaning, and implications of equality to a specially-trained elite. So
the approach entails a sort of elitist egalitarianism, or perhaps an
egalitarian elitism.
In addition, it is crucial to notice what, in an engaging discussion
of the controversy surrounding the decision of a public art gallery in
Australia to display Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ" exhibit, Reid
Mortensen of the University of Queensland describes as "the
ambiguous place the Christian tradition now occupies in modern
Professor Huntington has argued that a
Western culture."3 6
civilization is typically tied to some major religion,3 7 and for Western
"Western
civilization this religion has been Christianity.
Christianity, first Catholicism and then Catholicism and
Protestantism," Huntington asserts, "is historically the single most
important characteristic of Western civilization."3 8 More specifically,

35.

For a lengthier discussion, see SMITH, supra note 8, at Introduction and ch.

1.
36.
Reid Mortensen, Art, Expression and the Offended Believer, in LAW AND
RELIGION 181, 192 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000). Observing that the art community has
seemed more sensitive to the possibility of causing offense to Maori or Muslim
religionists, Mortensen comments:
The galleries were willing to intentionally offend Christians when they would
Almost
be most reluctant to offend other religionists in similar ways.
perversely, that arises precisely because of the dominance of Christianity in
Australia and New Zealand and the ambiguous place the Christian tradition
now occupies in modern Western culture.
Id. at 192.
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 42, 66 ("Of all the objective elements
37.
which define civilizations ....

the most important is religion ....

In the modern world,

religion is a central perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people.").
Id. at 70.
38.
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the Western achievement of religious freedom has been a direct
expression of the "prevailing dualism in Western culture" derived
from the Christian emphasis on a "[s]eparation of spiritual and
39
temporal authority."
Huntington's claims in this respect are easily corroborated.
Thus, early proponents of religious freedom in the United States,
40
such as Roger Williams, argued from distinctly Christian premises.
In a similar but less sectarian vein, as Marie Failinger explains,
Madison and Jefferson "relied on theological as well as secular
41
arguments."'
Madison's and Jefferson's rhetoric seems to be directed at a polity that
they, at least, believed did not question the existence of God. Thus,
some of their key arguments for religious freedom proposed that human
beings were created by God precisely to be free-thinking and freewilling, to make choices, including the choice for God, of their own will
and not under coercion from anyone else. Madison claimed that not
only did it go against human nature to coerce religious belief but also,
because no one could know what relationship God expected to have
with different human beings, coercing religious belief or behaviour
42
might threaten the Divine Plan.

If Western civilization-including Western religious freedom-is
in part a product of Christianity, however, it is also true that it is in
part the result of a revolt against the Christian tradition. 43 Indeed,
the standard assumption that the public sphere must be "secular"an assumption that, as noted, is a staple of the Western approachoften reflects a murkily-conceived effort to cleanse the public domain
of religion.
Thus, while noting that the U.S. constitutional
commitment was originally justified to a significant extent by
theological arguments, Failinger also observes that "most members of
the [U.S. Supreme] Court would never consider using [these
'44
arguments] today in a culture of religious pluralism."
It may seem ironic that a commitment to religious freedom
arising out of theological justifications might now have the effect of

39.
Id.
40.
See generally TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER
WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998).
41.
Failinger, supra note 2, at 93.
42.
Id.
43.
In a recent assessment, Charles Taylor explains that modern liberal
freedom came about in part as the result of a revolt against the Christian tradition.
CHARLES TAYLOR, A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 16-19 (James L. Heft ed., 1999). See, e.g.,
id. at 17 (asserting that "the fullness of rights culture couldn't have come about under
Christendom .. ").Even if it is not the cause of our confusions, the so-called conflict
between the clauses-a conflict in which one clause is thought to mean that
government cannot aid religious while the companion clause is said to mean that it
must-is surely a manifestation of the prevailing Western double-mindedness toward
religion.
44.
Failinger, supra note 2, at 93.
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excluding such justifications from public discourse,, and thus of
cutting off the commitment to religious freedom from its own source;
but such is the peculiar path that the modern discourse of religious
freedom has traveled. The irony is perhaps most conspicuous in the
observation that a faithful application of the Supreme Court's current
establishment clause doctrine, which forbids government to send
messages "endorsing" religion, would surely have the effect of
invalidating Thomas Jefferson's celebrated Virginia Statute for
Religious Liberty. That law began, after all, by explaining its own
rationale with the flagrant declaration that "Almighty God hath
created the mind free" and that violations of religious freedom were a
"departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion. '45 In
recent times, laws have been struck down for endorsing religion in far
46
less wanton ways.

THE EXHAUSTION OF THE WESTERN APPROACH?

It is plausible to view these features-legalism, rationalism,
individualism, religious privatism combined with public secularism, a
paradoxically elitist egalitarianism, and a deeply ambivalent attitude
toward the Christian tradition in which many of the other features
are historically rooted-as constituting a distinctively modern and
Western approach to the issues of religious freedom. And if the
considerable achievements in realizing religious freedom owe much to
such commitments, current confusions may be traceable to these
features as well.
To start with the last feature, it can hardly be surprising that a
public culture that seeks to slough off its traditional Christianity and
to construct a "secular" public domain devoid of religious purposes
and justifications might eventually find itself tongue-tied in trying to
say just what "religion" even is or why the exercise of "religion"
These difficulties are
should deserve special legal protection.4 7
approach. What
elitist
quality
of
the
Western
exacerbated by the
would one expect, after all, from an approach that assigns the task of
defining religion and protecting the exercise of religion to the class
that is most estranged from the Western religious tradition-that is,
to what Rex Ahdar describes as "the international subculture of

45.
For a detailed discussion of this paradox, see Steven D. Smith, The Rise
and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149
(1991).
46.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating law providing
that students could have a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer"
mainly because the words "voluntary prayer" sent message of endorsement).
47.
For a more elaborate argument on this point, see SMITH, supra note 8, at
ch. 3.
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persons in the -knowledge sector (academics, lawyers, media people
and so on)"?4 8 Reid Mortensen notes that in the controversy over the
Australian gallery's plan to display the Serrano "Piss Christ" exhibit,
one fact emerged clearly: public officials simply lacked any genuine
comprehension of the religious faith of those who were offended by
49
the exhibit.
The failure of this class to understand the real nature of religion
is reflected, among other ways, in the insistent characterization of
religion as simply a matter of private, individual choice. 50 And the
distortion of what "religion" is can in turn lead quite naturally to a
denatured understanding of what "the free exercise of religion" is
even about. Professor Failinger explains how the issue has been
transformed. "What began as an argument that government must
ensure a free response by the individual called distinctively by the
Divine within each unique religious tradition has, in modern-day
cases, become an argument for the protection of human
autonomy.. . . "51 As a result, "[w3hile the word 'conscience' is still
used, it has come to mean very little beyond the notion of personal
,,52
existential decision-making ....
Neither should it be surprising, given this failure of
comprehension, that scholars and lawyers would encounter difficulty
in distilling the meanings of religion and religious freedom into
neatly articulable rules or principles, enforceable in consistent legal
fashion by courts. We might predict as well that even a textual
provision explicitly mandating broad and vigorous protection for
religious exercise, such as Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, would be interpreted coyly and
unsympathetically, as Professor Evans' essay relates. The literal
command of the text is drowned, as it were, in a sea of subcultural
incomprehension. Whatever the words may seem to command, how

48.
Rex J. Ahdar, The Inevitability of Law and Religion: An Introduction, in
LAW AND RELIGION 1, 4 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000) (noting that this "knowledge sector"
subculture is an exception to the generalization that the world is becoming more
religious rather than more secular, as social scientists had long predicted).
49.
Mortensen, supra note 36, at 190. Mortensen observes:
All too frequently public officers underestimated the depth of the resentment
felt in some Christian communities, and that this resentment could spill into
violence.... However, the judge's assessment that religionists should not feel
wounded by degrading representations of their sacred symbols envisions a
rational, passionless Utopia that has no parallel in any human society ...
There was little appreciation that a person's suffering "offence" can represent
his or her genuine anger, frustration and rage.
Id. at 190-91.
50.
See van Bijsterveld, supra note 29, at 166 (pointing out the inadequacy of
the prevailing individualist view of religion).
51.
Failinger, supra note 2, at 93.
52.
Id. at 94.
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much commitment can we expect, after all, from officials who do not
understand just what they are supposed to be protecting or why they
are supposed to be protecting it?
In short, for all of its past achievements, the Western approach
today seems to have lost its moorings; it has great difficulty in
understanding its own subject matter. A concrete example of these
shortcomings is supplied by Davina Cooper's fascinating study of the
eruv controversy in Barnet, a borough in northwest London. An eruv,
Cooper explains, is a "Talmudic, symbolic perimeter" created in order
to permit Orthodox Jews to engage in necessary travel within a
limited space without violating Jewish law regulating movement on
the Sabbath. Although the perimeter is symbolic, it is.designated by
physical markings, and the requirements for establishing a valid eruv
can be complicated. In the London controversy, Jewish authorities
had concluded that the symbolic enclosure could be formed mainly by
already existing railway lines, fences, and walls; but a few open
spaces needed to be filled in, so proponents of the project applied to
the Barnet Planning Committee for permission to erect "a series of
poles joined by thin, high wire" in these spaces. This application
generated widespread and passionate opposition. Purporting to
ignore the religious dimension of the controversy, the Planning
Committee denied the application with the explanation that the poles
would be "visually intrusive and detrimental to the character and
appearance of the street scene." 53 After considerable investigation
and delay, this decision was eventually reversed by the Secretary of
State, who found the visual impact of the poles to be negligible but,
to take any official notice of
like the Planning Committee, declined
54
the dispute's religious dimension.
Cooper, a professor at Keele University who studied the dispute
and interviewed a number of residents and participants, notes that
"on the surface it does seem hard to fathom why a few poles joined by
thin, high wire should have engendered such panic, hatred and
fear." 55 Attempting to account for the passions generated on both
sides by the issue, she explores the underlying cultural and symbolic
significance of the proposed eruv. Opponents saw the eruv, she
explains, as "fundamentally irrational in its expression of premodern
norms. ''56 And they "emphasized both the importance of, and threat
posed to, stable, planned neighbourhoods regulated according to
rational, coherent norms." 7 These premodern and ostensibly

53.
Davina Cooper, 'And Was Jerusalem Builded Here?' Talmudic Territory
and the Modernist Defensive, in LAW AND RELIGION 199, 201-03 (Rex J. Ahdar ed.,

2000).
54.

Id.

55.
56.

Id. at 215.
Id. at 207.

57.

Id. at 207.
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irrational commitments were especially troublesome because eruv
supporters were attempting to project them into the public sphere,
which is supposed to be under the reign of secular rationality. Thus,
opponents perceived a huge difference between an eruv and a
synagogue or church. Even though the latter is much more visible,
the important distinction is that "people go into a building to worship;
with its doors closed, only attenders know what takes place. By
contrast, creating a perimeter around a neighbourhood or district
makes difference a 'public' matter. ' 58 In threatening the rational and
secular character of the public sphere, moreover, eruv supporters
were viewed as subverting the foundations of citizenship and of
legality itself. Their proposal to set up a few poles was thus perceived
as a menace to the very "discursive authority of the law." 59
Cooper's account underscores two features of the controversy.
First, the fervid resistance to the eruv was motivated by an effort to
defend, on the crucial level of public symbolism, commitments that
are central to the prevailing Western approach to religious freedom:
legality, rationalism, a secular public sphere. Second, those very
commitments paralyzed public officials in their efforts to address the
actual character of the dispute. Cramped by the constraints of
secular, legalistic rationalism, those officials could not take formal
cognizance of what everyone else knew-that is, of the symbolic and
religious character of the dispute. So officials confined themselves to
treating the controversy as one about visual clutter. Such is the level
of discourse to which the Western approach in its current modern
version may reduce us.

TRANSCENDING (OR RECOVERING?) THE WESTERN TRADITION?
The essays in this book, as noted, do not provide the kind of
payoff that one might have hoped for from a more international
discussion of religious freedom. They do not disclose, that is, any
legal system in which the engagement with issues of religious
freedom is discernibly more efficacious than that of the United States
and to which one might therefore look for guidance. On the contrary,
approximately the same daunting problems appear to arise almost
everywhere-or at least in the legal systems represented in this

58.
Id. at 208. Though eruv opponents were attempting to defend "the 'secular'
character of the public sphere," however, this commitment to secularism sat in uneasy
tension with a residual loyalty to Christianity. Id. at 215. Cooper notes that
Christianity and secularism are supposed to be antitheses. And on the face of things,
opponents of the eruv were fighting to maintain a "secular" public sphere. Id. But "[i]n
this conflict, the abstract citizen did not have to be scratched too hard to find its
Christian traces." Id. at 211.
59.
Id. at 203.
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collection. But that observation itself may point to a different but
Difficulties in understanding and addressing
valuable insight.
religious freedom, it seems, may result less from the distinctive
characteristics of the U.S. constitutional regime than from the
limitations inherent in a pervasive Western approach to these issues.
Do the essays hold out any hope of escape from these difficulties?
The answer to that question must be tentative. Studies like Professor
Cooper's at least suggest the possibility of achieving a better
understanding of what is at stake in religious freedom disputes by
adopting perspectives that are less purely rationalistic and legalistic
and more sensitive to underlying cultural and symbolic concerns. In
a related vein, Professor van Bijsterveld detects a gradual shift in the
"intellectual mood;" one that permits a greater recognition of the
social dimension of religion and that relies less on the 'hard
law'approach" to controversies in favor of greater use of "the 'soft'
approach-promotion, consultation, dialogue and education. '60 This
change, she foresees, will lead to reduced reliance on "the individualliberty, non-interference model" for addressing religious liberty
issues, and also to a greater willingness to accept religious
61
communities as "co-builders of a 'soul of Europe."'
These hopeful observations are impressionistic and speculative,
to be sure. It would be easy to dismiss them as amounting to little
more than platitudinous pleas for greater mutual respect and
understanding. A more substantive and perhaps radical possibility is
also imaginable, though it is only hinted at here obliquely-mostly in
Professor Ahdar's thoughtful but somewhat surprising introduction.
Ahdar's first paragraph notices the once familiar view that "[t]he
ultimate source of law is God or some God analogue."6 2 He draws
upon a classic essay by Yale law professor Arthur Leff6 3 in which Leff
claimed that "It]he ultimate source of authority in a legal system (the
'god' of that system) would seem to be either divine and transcendent,
on the one hand, or temporal and earthly, on the other. The choice is
between God (or Gods) and Man (or mankind). '64 Claims such as
these might once have seemed almost axiomatic, Ahdar goes on to
observe, and they are still accepted, for example, in Muslim cultures.
Such claims, however, are controversial in our current Western

60.
Van Bijsterveld, supra note 29, at 177.
Id. at 176-77. In a similar spirit, Professor Mortensen rejects the
61.
application of blasphemy law as a remedy for offense to the sensibilities and faith of
religious believers, but he urges public officials and others to take greater ethical
responsibility for their decisions instead of treating legality as a license for
disregarding such concerns. Mortensen, supra note 36, at 190-93.
62.
Ahdar, supranote 48, at 1.
63.
Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229.
Ahdar, supra note 48, at 1.
64.
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culture-or rather they would be controversial, at best, if they were
considered seriously at all.
Ahdar explains how the increasingly systematic separation of
law from religion has pushed such claims from view, leaving law-and
public culture generally-increasingly secular. On the plus side, we
may ascribe our realization of religious freedom to that development.
But the separation also has its costs. Ahdar quotes Wolfhart
Pannenberg's assertion that a secular public order generates "a
feeling of meaninglessness" in citizens, and he adds that "[t]he
anomie experienced by postmodern man is a much noted
phenomenon. '65 In such a situation, it is doubtful that authority and
law can continue to flourish. "To work effectively," Ahdar asserts,
"law must rely on more than coercive sanctions (there are simply not
enough policemen in the world); it must attract people's trust and
commitment. Quite simply, citizens must (in a certain sense) place
"66
their faith in it.
These observations may seem unduly portentous as an
introduction to the essays that follow-and that Ahdar's introduction
then proceeds to summarize. Surely none of the following essays
addresses or explores these claims and questions in any deliberate
way. Nonetheless, in these opening pages, it seems that Ahdar is
seeking to re-engage the questions that characterized the Western
tradition from which our modern issues in law and religion descend,
but which that tradition in its modern form has by now largely
suppressed. The implication, it seems, is that in order to address the
issues of the interaction of law and religion in an efficacious way, we
must not only acknowledge that religion is a social phenomenonalthough it is that, as Professor van Bijsterveld suggests-or that it
has a symbolic dimension-as Professor Cooper recognizes. Beyond
these adjustments, we would probably need to move beyond talking
about "religion" as a reified or discrete phenomenon to be inspected,
discussed, and dealt with, and again engage the more ultimate claims
that "religion" has typically encompassed.
At this point, the suggestions posed by Ahdar seem to converge
with the analysis of Professor Huntington. Huntington argues, in a
remarkably matter-of-fact and pragmatic tone, that Christianity lies
at the heart of Western civilization with its accomplishments, and
that if this civilization is to remain viable it will eventually have to
make its peace with its Christian heritage.6 7 If there is a chance of
getting beyond our current frustrations, in short, it may lie not so
much in either softening or transcending the Western approach as in

65.
Id. at 4 (quoting Wolfgang Pannenberg, How to Think About Secularism,
FIRST THINGS, June-July 1996, at 27, 30).
Ahdar, supra note 48, at 1-5.
66.
67.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 70, 305.
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more completely recovering it-in recovering, that is, the
philosophical and theological sources that lie at the foundation of our
civilization's achievements in, among other things, religious freedom.

